Walther Wever, one of the most respected members of the Luftwaffe, served the Luftwaffe at its highest in chain of command. He controlled the entire Luftwaffe from the depths of the headquarters, determining what would be needed for Germany to win the war against the world. From multiple primary sources from the time, it is well known that Wever commanded the Luftwaffe extremely effectively and had a great sense of the direction the Luftwaffe should take. One such primary source would be his journal or personal log, containing his memoirs and ideas. The log contained his personal thoughts on matters, his thoughts on the shape of the Luftwaffe, and ideas for the future of the Luftwaffe – all of these extremely promising for Germany’s success.
1936, the years of great success for the Luftwaffe under leadership of Wever that preceded were over. Wever had died in an aircraft accident, flying on a leisure flight over the German country and encountered failure with one of his systems and despite his skills as a pilot, lost control of the craft. The crash site was soon found and Wever given the most respectful farewell, for with him, died the secrets to air superiority.
The source details extremely advanced ideas and tactics which Wever had developed himself, some of these being his thoughts on strategic bombing, as well as the importance of radio technology. In great detail, Wever explores where these tactics should be employed and his predictions of the war. These examples confirm that Wever truly was a brilliant leader for the Luftwaffe, and that his death proved a decisive blow to the Luftwaffe.
It was clear that by World War 2, the Radio would become a tool instrumental in achieving air superiority. The technologies that England was able to utilise with Radio like the early warning system gave them the upper hand in many situations, allowing them to be able to detect fighters and bombers hours before they would pass the English shores. Interceptors would be sent to handle the situation and protect England from the deadly bombing of the Luftwaffe.
The Germans on the other hand, developed far more advance systems in the radio field such as jamming, communications networks and several others. Aircraft in the Luftwaffe were now being outfitted with radio units, enabling them to communicate without the use of hand signals or wing waggling, this proved useful to the pilots and more efforts were applied into the field. At the same time, the Luftwaffe had to adapt to the new technology, pilot school in Germany were now required to teach the basics of operating the radio and how to maintain it in flight. Aircraft manufacturers also recognised this and tried to advance in the path as well, Messerschmitt started creating large double engine heavy fighters large enough to house large reconnaissance radio units for scouting and coordination for night fighting.
Britain's sudden introduction of the detection system became troublesome for the Luftwaffe, many of the squadrons being sent to England were falling out of the skies to the interceptor Spitfires sent up by the English detection command. The German solution was a radio/radar jamming system, which jammed radar/radio waves so that they wouldn't show up on the detection systems. This innovation is one of the earliest concepts of aircraft stealth, to avoid detection in order to increase success and survivability - an idea that modern jet fighters are built around. These examples go to show how much the invention of radar/radio technology had affected the air forces, ushering a new age of detection and stealth.
The Luftwaffe for some reason favoured a certain aircraft type over any other, the zerostorer or destroyer -universally known as a Heavy Fighter. Heavy fighters are called so for their immense size of a light bomber (in fact, many actually were re-fitted to fly as light bombers when all the real bombers were out of commission) and their twin engines. These fighters were mostly terrible at manoeuvring and were thus used strafing with boom and zoom tactics, also employing the extremely heavy weaponry able to be carried by the massive craft. This seemed like a great idea on paper though in practice, the crafts were outclassed in every fashion by the average fighter interceptor, the more nimble crafts could dodge heavy fighter's attacks with ease and often could shoot down the heavy fighters. The situation was worse when the heavy fighter's assigned role was to intercept allied bombers and fighters, the H.F was good at climbing to heights but when encountered by the fighter escorts of the bomber units, they would have no energy and be in the worst position - slow and unable to turn. Soon, the extremely redundant decision to send regular fighters to escort the heavy fighters was made (for what is the point of sending an interceptor that needs escorts, the very same escorts that the attacking bombers need) and the Luftwaffe saw some success in those operations. The only advantage recognised by the pilots was its stealth capabilities, but this was only realised by the Luftwaffe command until later in the war.
After time has passed, the Luftwaffe finally experimented in finding a proper role for the heavy fighter. Aircraft designers saw that the extra room could be utilised to house jamming and night flying instruments to allow it to carry out missions at night. Such was the next role of the heavy fighter with existing fighters being upgraded with the new units that would allow for coordinated night flying. Documentation on the English part recalls the chaos that ensued the first night heavy fighter attack as the English had no fighting forces that could fly at night, from then on, the Luftwaffe recognised the success and continued night sorties. The heavy fighter saw all sorts of night operations during its service, from light bombing to reconnaissance; the fighter was a well suited craft for its role.
Each of these examples showcase the logistics and complications the Luftwaffe encountered with advancements in technology like aircraft design and the more complex radar. The Luftwaffe had waged war in new age, and air combat would not be the same as the simplistic sorties of WW1. The Luftwaffe learned to change and adapt to these emerging technologies while also implementing them into their own forces, affecting their organisation drastically,
1936, the years of great success for the Luftwaffe under leadership of Wever that preceded were over. Wever had died in an aircraft accident, flying on a leisure flight over the German country and encountered failure with one of his systems and despite his skills as a pilot, lost control of the craft. The crash site was soon found and Wever given the most respectful farewell, for with him, died the secrets to air superiority.
The source details extremely advanced ideas and tactics which Wever had developed himself, some of these being his thoughts on strategic bombing, as well as the importance of radio technology. In great detail, Wever explores where these tactics should be employed and his predictions of the war. These examples confirm that Wever truly was a brilliant leader for the Luftwaffe, and that his death proved a decisive blow to the Luftwaffe.
It was clear that by World War 2, the Radio would become a tool instrumental in achieving air superiority. The technologies that England was able to utilise with Radio like the early warning system gave them the upper hand in many situations, allowing them to be able to detect fighters and bombers hours before they would pass the English shores. Interceptors would be sent to handle the situation and protect England from the deadly bombing of the Luftwaffe.
The Germans on the other hand, developed far more advance systems in the radio field such as jamming, communications networks and several others. Aircraft in the Luftwaffe were now being outfitted with radio units, enabling them to communicate without the use of hand signals or wing waggling, this proved useful to the pilots and more efforts were applied into the field. At the same time, the Luftwaffe had to adapt to the new technology, pilot school in Germany were now required to teach the basics of operating the radio and how to maintain it in flight. Aircraft manufacturers also recognised this and tried to advance in the path as well, Messerschmitt started creating large double engine heavy fighters large enough to house large reconnaissance radio units for scouting and coordination for night fighting.
Britain's sudden introduction of the detection system became troublesome for the Luftwaffe, many of the squadrons being sent to England were falling out of the skies to the interceptor Spitfires sent up by the English detection command. The German solution was a radio/radar jamming system, which jammed radar/radio waves so that they wouldn't show up on the detection systems. This innovation is one of the earliest concepts of aircraft stealth, to avoid detection in order to increase success and survivability - an idea that modern jet fighters are built around. These examples go to show how much the invention of radar/radio technology had affected the air forces, ushering a new age of detection and stealth.
The Luftwaffe for some reason favoured a certain aircraft type over any other, the zerostorer or destroyer -universally known as a Heavy Fighter. Heavy fighters are called so for their immense size of a light bomber (in fact, many actually were re-fitted to fly as light bombers when all the real bombers were out of commission) and their twin engines. These fighters were mostly terrible at manoeuvring and were thus used strafing with boom and zoom tactics, also employing the extremely heavy weaponry able to be carried by the massive craft. This seemed like a great idea on paper though in practice, the crafts were outclassed in every fashion by the average fighter interceptor, the more nimble crafts could dodge heavy fighter's attacks with ease and often could shoot down the heavy fighters. The situation was worse when the heavy fighter's assigned role was to intercept allied bombers and fighters, the H.F was good at climbing to heights but when encountered by the fighter escorts of the bomber units, they would have no energy and be in the worst position - slow and unable to turn. Soon, the extremely redundant decision to send regular fighters to escort the heavy fighters was made (for what is the point of sending an interceptor that needs escorts, the very same escorts that the attacking bombers need) and the Luftwaffe saw some success in those operations. The only advantage recognised by the pilots was its stealth capabilities, but this was only realised by the Luftwaffe command until later in the war.
After time has passed, the Luftwaffe finally experimented in finding a proper role for the heavy fighter. Aircraft designers saw that the extra room could be utilised to house jamming and night flying instruments to allow it to carry out missions at night. Such was the next role of the heavy fighter with existing fighters being upgraded with the new units that would allow for coordinated night flying. Documentation on the English part recalls the chaos that ensued the first night heavy fighter attack as the English had no fighting forces that could fly at night, from then on, the Luftwaffe recognised the success and continued night sorties. The heavy fighter saw all sorts of night operations during its service, from light bombing to reconnaissance; the fighter was a well suited craft for its role.
Each of these examples showcase the logistics and complications the Luftwaffe encountered with advancements in technology like aircraft design and the more complex radar. The Luftwaffe had waged war in new age, and air combat would not be the same as the simplistic sorties of WW1. The Luftwaffe learned to change and adapt to these emerging technologies while also implementing them into their own forces, affecting their organisation drastically,